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REACTION
THE PRE-SESSION RECESS
Peter Strauss *
In the brief remarks following, I do not address the Burkean argument Professor Sunstein so persuasively suggests, that practice has established the permissibility of recess appointments during the week-ormore adjournments of Congress that modern transportation modalities
permit. We can perhaps let President Eisenhower’s recess appointments of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Stewart
stand witness to that understanding. Rather, I want to suggest flaws in
the originalist analysis used by the Canning court and in the Senate’s
ruse of meeting every three days over the winter period of 2011–12 that
many take to place the January 4, 2012 recess appointments President
Obama made to the NLRB and to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau outside that practice.
If one is going to approach the Constitution as an originalist, as the
Canning court so emphatically did, one might at least explore the meaning a clause would have been understood to have at the time of its adoption. All three judges of the D.C. Circuit understood the use of the definite article “the” to signal that the only qualifying recess during which
recess appointments could be made was at the conclusion of a session
when Congress had adjourned “sine die,” that is, to await the commencement of the next session for which the Constitution provided.
Two of them held, further, that the only possible recess appointments
were those that arose during those singular recesses. Neither interpretation is credible given the realities of the eighteenth century.
At the time the Recess Appointment Clause was written, the Constitution anticipated that the Senate might not sit until December. Article
I, Section 4, Clause 2 provides “The Congress shall assemble at least
once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in
December, unless they shall by Law [i.e., with the President’s approval]
appoint a different Day.” The natural implication here is that there
could readily be more than one recess (“meet at least once”), and that a
recess was as likely to precede as to follow (or both) a period of assembly. Given the realities of transportation and communication, and the
likely need of many members to be home for planting and harvesting
seasons, it must have been anticipated that recess appointments would
often be made — and some of them, to positions that had become va–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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cant too late in a congressional sitting for the Senate to have been able
to receive a nomination, consider, and consent to it. News of vacancies
occurring during a session might very well not even reach the President
until after the Congress had risen.
The first five Congresses met for two-year terms that uniformly
ended in early March (when a presidential inauguration might occur).
Save for the first Congress, however, their initial meetings occurred
substantially later in the year — October 24, 1791 for the Second; December 2, 1793 for the Third; December 7, 1795 for the Fourth; and
May 15, 1797 for the Fifth. Each of these Congresses adjourned “sine
die” only at the end of its elected life — i.e., in March of 1791, 1793,
1795, 1797, and 1799. There were lengthy adjournments between nominal sessions of each — for example, September 29, 1789 to January 4,
1790 and August 12, 1790 to December 6, 1790 in the First; July 10,
1797 to November 13, 1797 and July 16, 1798 to December 3, 1798 in
the Fifth. These adjournments were not “sine die,” however, but to
fixed dates — that is, they were what the majority characterizes as mere
adjournments. In the travel circumstances of the time, short recesses
were not likely; as Professor Sunstein remarks, nominal intrasession recesses did not even occur until after the Civil War, when the nation’s
rail system had matured.
And transparently, during
these lengthy breaks — all of them, whether adjournment was sine die
or to a fixed date of return — the possibility of making recess appointments necessarily applied. And it necessarily was there, too, to fill vacancies that, whenever occurring, had not become known to the President until Congress had adjourned or had become known too late for its
action upon a nomination.
The Canning court did not bother to acquaint itself with these realities. But, in my judgment, understanding the original constitutional
text in terms of the nation’s original circumstances quite destroys both
elements of the Canning majority’s formalistic opinion — that “the Recess” is a singular time necessarily occurring only on adjournment sine
die of a given Congress’s “session” following rather than preceding its
assembling, and that a qualified vacancy must happen during that very
recess.
This does not resolve the stalemate questions underlying Professor
Vermeule’s persuasive concerns with precautionary constitutionalism.
These could arise if a President failed to submit a nomination while
there was time for the Senate to consider it (which he might decide not
to do just in order to create a recess appointment opportunity for himself once the Senate rose), if the Senate simply declined to consider an
appointment timely submitted (as with Mr. Cordray), or if the Senate
created nominal meetings at which real business could not be transacted in order to defeat the possibility of recess appointments (as has
happened here, and earlier in the Bush Administration). Unilateral behaviors on either side intended to frustrate the Constitution’s provisions
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(and in the Senate’s case, to frustrate the effective functioning of lawful
government by denying leadership to ordained agencies) deserve harsh
condemnation, as he suggests. That does not render them legally ineffective but it does create a certain vector of movement.
Consider, in this light, Section 2 of the Twentieth Amendment,
which since 1933 has provided “The Congress shall assemble at least
once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day
of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.” (Emphasis
added.) Unless there was such a law, then, the second “session” of the
112th Congress began on January 3, 2012 — the day before the challenged recess appointments were made. The pagination and titling of
the Congressional Record confirms this understanding. There is a more
important possible consequence of the President’s having delayed the
recess appointments to January 4, 2012 than the one widely credited as
the reason for it (that is, so that he could earn an extra year for the appointments’ validity).
The more important possible consequence, in my judgment, was to
place them within the first “recess” of the 112th Congress’s second session, one that lasted from January 3 at least until January 17, when the
House first assembled a quorum ready for business, and so well within
the “liquidated practices” Professor Vermeule evokes. Whatever we may
think of the disreputable resolutions by which House and Senate pretended to meet during the final days of its first session, from midDecember until January 2, they were resolutions of that session, and not
laws. It is transparent from the Congressional Record of January 3, 2012,
that the Congress did not “assemble” on that day — or any other day until much later in the month. Should the first sessions’ resolutions, which
are not “law,” be treated as binding the second session? And if not, was
the second session’s Senate not in recess from January 3 on, until it actually did “assemble”?
Here’s a congressional practice liquidated under the Twentieth
Amendment that strikes me as arguably determinative in this case, and
that could provide the Supreme Court with its own opportunity to address Professor Vermeule’s “countervailing risks” and their implications.
Ever since 1934, newly elected Congresses regularly have assembled on
or near the third of January; when they have, they just as regularly have
sent a communication to the President informing him that a quorum is
present and they are ready to do business. And a quick march through
the Congressional Record reveals that second sessions sent the same
communications in every even-numbered year from 1934 through the
end of the millennium, as soon as the second session had actually assembled. This did not always occur on or about the third of January,
but it constitutes an impressive show of understanding what it means to
obey the Constitution’s command to “assemble.” (Just as invariably, the
Congressional Record has begun renumbering for the second session on
January 3, as it did in 2012.) After 2000, the second session practice be-
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came more sporadic, but the Congressional Record for January 17, 2012
shows that the House adopted such a communication that day, when it
first assembled. No such communication was sent (or honestly possible)
by the second session of the 112th Congress on January 3, 2012, the day
before the challenged appointments were made.
Might the Court, apprised of this history, find in its manifested understanding of what the command to “assemble” connotes a means of
repudiating the Senate’s destructive, unilateral behavior? From the
moment the Constitution took effect, it has been clear that the period
prior to assembly must be a time when recess appointments can be
made. One session’s resolution how it will go about its business, not being a “law,” cannot effectively delay the obligation to assemble that, by
the Constitution, marks the beginning of the next “session.” So one has
a two week period, January 3–January 17, 2012, during which the
second session of the 112th Congress existed but Congress had not yet
assembled — a relatively lengthy recess during which recess appointments might be made.

